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Abstract
The emergence of the issue of halal products, both in the form of food and services, has also led 
to competition regarding the certification of halal products. Studies on competition between 
certification bodies have been carried out, but these studies do not focus on the competition 
that occurs in Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia which is a big market for the halal 
industry. In Indonesia, the implementation of the regulation of Halal Product Guarantee (HPG) 
in Law No. 33 2014 still raises problems, including the related issue of inter-organizational 
relations. This article discusses the relations between organizations based on the interpretation 
of each party related to the Halal Product Guarantee policy, and the consequences arising from 
it. This article used new institutional theory, and a semiotics approach as analysis of verbal signs 
and gestures raised by each of the parties. This article argued that the interpretations of each 
organizational actor towards the new halal certification policy in Indonesia are driven by different 
institutional reasons/logics, resulting in contradictions, even conflicts related to the relationship 
between organizations implementing the policy. The difference in meaning, especially in the 
connotative meaning, shows the difference in institutional logic. Thus, there is a divergence in 
meaning. Therefore, it is important to equate significance (meaning/interpretation) to each of 
the institutions related to Halal Product Guarantee in order to realize the implementation of the 
regulations properly.
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Introduction
Since the mid-1990s, the emergence of 
the issue of halal products, both in the form of 
food and services, has also led to competition 
regarding the certification of halal products. 
Every certification body wants to be seen 
as “more halal” than other certifiers.  This 
competition has been going on for more 
than two decades in all continents, mostly 
in industrialized countries without Muslim 
traditions, and also in several Muslim exporting 
countries, mostly in Southeast Asia (Bergeaud-
Blackler, 2015). Studies on competition between 
certification bodies have been carried out, but 
these studies do not focus on the competition 
that occurs in Southeast Asian countries, 
because it is considered that the institutions 
that handle halal certification in these countries 
are public institutions that have been appointed 
by the state, while in other countries where 
Muslims are a minority it is carried out 
by private institutions (Bergeaud-Blackler, 
2015). In addition, comparative studies on 
halal certification bodies (Latif, Mohamed, 
Sharifuddin, Abdullah, & Ismail, 2014) have 
not analyzed many halal certification bodies in 
Indonesia, especially after the issuance of new 
regulations on halal guarantee in 2014.
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Law No. 33 of 2014 concerning Halal 
Product Guarantee was implemented in 
Indonesia on October 17, 2019. However, the 
“authority transfer” from LPPOM MUI to 
BPJPH has not been fully completed (Focus 
Group Discussion on BPJPH Business Strategy 
Plan prepared by the Center for Religious 
Guidance and Service Guidance and Services 
Religious in August 2019). The real problem is 
a set of meanings that are not easily revealed 
in the rivalry, because each party stands 
with the “truth” that was built. The writer’s 
meeting with the Chairperson of a provincial 
LPPOM shows that there are ‘things’ not easily 
resolved in formal forums. “We do not have 
the authority to provide data, because we have 
submitted all data to the center (read: Central 
LPPOM)” (interview with the Chairperson of 
the Provincial LPPOM X, August 2019). 
Signs of rivalry reappeared after a series 
of meetings, both informally and formally 
through discussion forums with BPJPH officials 
at various levels, which showed that the “MUI 
relationship with BPJPH” was difficult to 
comprehend. Law Number 33 Year 2014 and 
Government Regulation Number 31 Year 2019 
have indeed set the roles of each party in the 
Halal Product Guarantee (HPG), but they 
certainly have a “meaning” respectively for 
both parties. Even NU has firmly rejected the 
halal product guarantee law allegedly causing a 
monopoly (NU Online, 2020). Besides, there are 
several omnibus laws of articles in the Act. No. 
33 of 2014 due to the issuance of employment 
copyright law (Saputra, 2020).
This article will explore the meaning 
b e h i n d  t h e  ‘ p h e n o m e n o n ’  o f  i n t e r -
organizational relations issues related to 
halal product guarantee. The issue of this 
relationship is trying to be traced through the 
interpretation of each of the parties over the 
regulations, namely Law No. 33 of 2014 and 
PP No. 31 of 2019. Understanding the style of 
language between those in BPJPH and those 
in MUI becomes very important, because in 
the future these two large organizations will 
continue to interact. Although searching for 
meaning is a subjective problem, seeing what 
is written and what is implied is  interesting in 
the study of language, especially if it is related 
to the expression of the meaning of policy 
regulation.
Many studies on halal policy in Indonesia 
have been carried out (Afroniyati, 2014; 
Akim, Konety, Purnama, & Korina, 2019; Asa, 
2019), but there are still gaps in knowledge 
about the interpretation of policies issued 
and their implications for relations between 
organizations related to these policies. 
Linking to institutional theory, the current 
issues for institutional theorists are about 
institutional complexity and contradiction, as 
well as organizational responses to institutional 
pressures (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 
2010; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, 
& Lounsbury, 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010; 
Reay & Hinings, 2009; Thomann, Lieberherr, 
& Ingold, 2016). However, the study of halal 
policy interpretation and its implications for 
inter-organizational relations based on the 
perspective of institutional theory is still limited. 
This research fills the gap by applying an new 
institutional theory framework (institutional 
logic) (P. Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2015) 
assisted by a semiotic approach. The semiotic 
approach and new institutional theory, known 
as institutional semiotics (Arnold, Kozinets, 
& Handelman, 2001), can help understand 
the divergence of interpretations of each 
organization on the halal product guarantee 
policy. 
Based on the background of the problem, 
the formulation of the problems proposed in 
this research are: how certain institutional logic 
(e.g. Religion, business, profession) influences 
organizational actors from BPJPH, MUI, 
universities, and firms interpret halal product 
guarantee policy (government regulation)?; 
how is divergent interpretation related to 
inter organizational relation involved in halal 
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product guarantee? With the formulation, 
this article argues that the interpretations of 
each organizational actor towards the new 
halal product policy in Indonesia are driven 
by different institutional logics, resulting 
in contradictions, even conflicts related 
to the relationship between organizations 
implementing the policy.
Thus, this article fills a gap in knowledge 
about certification body competition that 
occurs in line with the fast-growing demand 
for the halal market in the world with the case 
of Indonesia being one of the largest halal 
markets. In addition, by looking at the language 
style of this competition, this study contributes 
to the semiotic approach and institutional 
logic that can be used in seeing the rivalry of 
certification bodies in Indonesia.
Literature review
There were studies concerning the 
development of halal regulations (Akim 
et al., 2019; Asa, 2019), its implementation 
(Anwar, Fahrullah, & Ridlwan, 2018; Nafis, 
2019; Othman, Shaarani, & Bahron, 2016; 
Zulkifli & Mochammad Sahid, 2018), and its 
organizations (Afroniyati, 2014; Faidah, 2017), 
as well as problems in certification (Prabowo, 
Rahman, Rahman, & Samah, 2015; Viverita 
& Kusumastuti, 2017). Except Afroniyati and 
Faidah’s study, the studies have not revealed 
the inter-organizational relations  after the 
enactment of the Act No. 33 of 2014 and its 
derivative regulations. Akim et al.’s study 
has shown the advantages of transferring 
halal certification into the state, although it 
must immediately prepare all the necessary 
infrastructure, but it has not revealed the 
“conflict” in the organizational transformation. 
The other studies (Wahyudi, Asikin, & Haq, 
2020) have actually proposed some weaknesses 
of the latest regulations on halal certification in 
Indonesia, but have not yet explained the root 
causes of these weaknesses, which according to 
this article are inter-institutional relations issues.
The tension between MUI and the 
government in halal certification has actually 
been pointed out by Hosen (2012). Hosen 
has written that halal fatwas, audits, and 
certifications cannot be in the hands of one 
organization. This will create a monopoly - 
as also analyzed by another study (Lindsey, 
2012), and potentially provide an opportunity 
for companies or business people who are not 
responsible for negotiating prices and costs 
in submitting halal certification (Hosen, 2012, 
p. 16). Hosen also has proposed that other 
organizations or institutions must also be able 
to issue halal certificates, to avoid monopolies 
and reduce costs. It is not appropriate for MUI 
to be involved in the business side of halal 
certification. They must maintain their initial 
role in providing fatwas and guidance, like NU 
and Muhammadiyah.
Halal certification by MUI, especially 
before promulgation in clear regulations 
and since the emergence of the Halal Product 
Guarantee draft laws, was allegedly not only 
religiously charged but also a “commercial 
commodification” (economy) (Afroniyati, 
2014). In line with the two studies above, 
another study also states that in Indonesia, MUI 
- as a social organization - monopolizes halal 
certification (Othman et al., 2016).  The same was 
proposed by Faidah ( 2017) for the case of halal 
product certification in general, and Suharko 
et al. (2018) for the context of halal tourism 
products, precisely the relationship between 
the state and the community (community 
organizations), namely MUI. However, the 
studies did not discuss the views of each 
organization related to the halal certification 
after the latest regulation was published (Law 
No. 33 of 2014). Previously LPPOM MUI 
was the only authoritative institution issuing 
halal certification, but now it has become the 
government’s authority. The transformation 
of this role is still new, meaning regulatory 
transition, from the old regulation to the new 
one, so that tensions might arise, and it impacts 
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on changes in authority. This research attempts 
to trace these problems.
The difference in interpretation of 
regulation, in the light of the new institutional 
theory, is due to different institutional logics 
(Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Greenwood et al., 
2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009; P. Thornton et al., 
2015), which causes divergence in interpretation. 
This divergence in interpretation causes 
contradiction and conflict between organizations 
that implement halal product policies, so that 
policy implementation does not work. To see 
the differences in interpretation and response, 
this article uses a semiotic theoretical framework 
which shows “language stye” related to power 
relationships (Wareing, 2004). 
Semiotics and symbol studies as a 
theoretical framework in analyzing socio-
cultural issues, including in public policy, public 
administration, and corporate culture issues, 
have been used, although rarely in Indonesia 
(Atkinson, 2018, 2019; Bondestam, 2004; Fiol, 
1989; Garrick & Pendergast, 2014; Goodsell, 
1977; Kurland & Aleci, 2015).  Semiotics has also 
been used to research institutional semiotics 
which focuses on Jakobson’s semiotics (Arnold 
et al., 2001). This research does not use Jakobson 
semiotics, but Barthes semiotics.
The use of Barthesian semiotics has also 
been exemplified by a study of the Regional 
Aspirations Fund (Pasoloran, 2016). From 
some public policy research experiences using 
a semiotic approach, this research sought to 
understand the meanings from institutions 
related to the discourse of Halal Product 
Guarantee (HPG) after the issuance of the 
Act. No. 33 of 2014 and PP. No. 31 of 2019. 
The meanings arose because of the process of 
interpretation (“significance” in the term of 
semiotics) of each institution related to Halal 
Product Guarantee. 
The semiotic proposition used to 
understand the problem of studying relations 
between organizations is the similarity of 
significance which means there is the same 
understanding of the connotative meaning of 
Halal Product Guarantee regulations, so that 
it will bring about sucessful implementation 
of regulations as well as inter-institutional 
relations that handle these regulations. At the 
same time, the similarity in understanding 
is the similarity of institutional logic (based 
in institutional theory) in each organization 
related to halal certification.
Methods
This research was conducted through a 
qualitative approach by taking the case of halal 
certification regulations in Indonesia on the 
grounds that, Indonesia is one of the countries 
with the largest Muslim majority in the world, 
of course this has implications for the large 
demand for halal products, and therefore 
makes a lot of requests for halal certification 
services. Because the problem studied is about 
the subjective meanings of each organizational 
actor, the approach chosen is qualitative.
The research was conducted in four steps. 
The first is interview which was more directed at 
the verbal observations of the subjects including 
their expressions or gestures when they were 
speaking verbally. Interview data were the main 
source of this research, because the researcher 
could read the data with a semiotic framework. 
Informants are selected purposively based 
on competence in organizations related to 
halal product policies, such as MUI halal 
auditors, MUI halal certification managers 
(LPPOM MUI), halal certification service 
officers at the regional Ministry of Religion 
offices, Halal Inspection Agency (LPH) from 
universities, and entrepreneurs/firms. From 
each of these organizations at least one person 
we interviewed. Informants were selected and 
determined to represent each of the institutions 
involved in HPG based on the longest and most 
intensively involved persons in HPG activities 
or halal certification. 
The interviews were conducted by asking 
questions focusing on inter-organization 
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relations problems. Of course, these questions 
were only used to begin the interviews. 
Furthermore, the researcher could explore 
practically with a variety of other sentences to 
capture the meaning behind what was said by 
the informants. The interviews were probing, 
which included exploring continuously to get 
answers believed by the informants.
Interviews were conducted simultaneously 
with close attention to  the movements, or 
gestures of each informant to get a complete 
understanding of each party. To avoid conflict 
and maintain research ethics, location and 
names of informants were pseudonyms. We 
only show the position of informants in the 
organization as previously described.  The same 
was true for non-LPPOM LPH organizations. 
Knowing which regions submitted judicial 
reviews and which did not could be the only 
clue of the informants and the location for this 
research.
The second, to obtain data on HPG 
discourse in general, this research relied on 
document studies and literature studies to see 
the discourse that appeared in the media about 
inter-organizational relations related to HPG. 
This discourse that appeared in this media 
was important as preliminary data before 
it was clarified by data directly obtained by 
researchers. This media source was certainly 
a secondary source, but it still needed to be 
considered in understanding the journey of 
inter-agency relations after the Act. No. 30 of 
2019 and after it took effect on October 17.
The third, document study was also 
conducted on a series of regulations issued 
related to HPG. This study also tried to present 
a general view of HPG and halal certification as 
stipulated in the regulation. The researchers 
attempted to read regulatory texts, and then 
they were tested with a series of interviews 
to obtain meaningful data conducted by 
institutions related to HPG. To read the 
regulations was limited to the effort to present 
“denotative meaning” about HPG regulation. 
This reading was limited to aspects of inter-
institutional relations in HPG.
With these data, the researchers could 
finally interpret the meaning of the second level 
or significance in semiotic analysis. Therefore, 
semiotics is a way to understand the data that 
has been obtained. Semiotics or semiology is 
the science of signs (henceforth, taking into 
account of the popularity of the terms used, 
this research used the word “semiotics”). 
The “sign” itself is something that refers to 
something else. For example, say A refers to 
A1 and so on. However, the actual study or 
analysis of semiotics is not about a study of A, 
but a study of the relationship between A and 
A1 (Christomy, 2010). There are several forms of 
signs, and those relevant to this research are the 
ones in the form of activities and performances 
(Berger, 2015, p. 37). “Something that we do will 
mark a big decision,” wrote Berger. “We give a 
lot of signs with body language, gestures that 
we do,” continued Berger. When explaining 
the shape of this sign, Berger cites the analysis 
of Roland Barthes (1972, pp. 26–29), one of the 
leading figures in the Sausserian semiotics 
(structuralism semiotic which shows binary 
opposition of the language; surface and deep 
structure), when describing a scene in a film. 
He has explained that sweating is a sign of 
one’s inner feelings. Sweating can indicate 
someone who is afraid. This means that 
gestures, physical appearance, or changes in the 
body mark a particular thought. This is useful 
when interpreting various body movements or 
gestures of a person.
The most important thing in the semiotics 
analysis is about the analysis of “significance” 
(Sunardi, 2004). This term is one that is often 
used in semiotic analysis. Significance is 
a process of meaning of a sign. However, 
significance does not mean “meaning” in 
itself. A sign, in the process of significance, 
has meaning if it has a relationship with 
another sign, whether it is an associative/
paradigmatic, syntagmatic, symbolic, or 
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connotative relationship. According to 
Barthes’s semiotic view, the analysis of the 
significance of the sign must always reach 
the meaning at the second level. With a little 
modification, this research means significance 
as “meaning that contains value for those who 
give meaning to signs”  namely the meaning 
that is considered important and valuable 
for the giver of meaning, or in Barthes’s term 
called connotative (Barthes, 1972, p. 117, 1986, 
p. 39; Hoed, 2010, pp. 52–53). Therefore, based 
on the explanation, when getting verbal signs 
and gestures, this research did not stop at the 
primary or first meaning system, but continued 
on the secondary or second meaning system. 
Secondary meaning is connotative meaning 
given by a person or community. 
Then where does the semiotic limit work 
in “investigating the meaning” behind the sign? 
The answer to this can refer to Umberto Eco’s 
statement (Christomy, 2010, p. 142), which 
is “interpretants are testable and describable 
correspondent associated by public agreement 
to another sign.” An interpretation of the sign 
must still be tested by the public agreement 
on the other signs. This was demonstrated by 
Barthes (1992). The context can be searched 
from various sources, such as mass media, 
regulations, and some previous studies.
Through the Barthesian semiotic theory 
framework, this research has considered that 
harmonious relations between organizations 
related to HPG will be realized if there is a 
similar meaning (significance) to HPG discourse 
as stated in the published regulations. If each 
of the institutions has a different significance, 
this will disrupt inter-organizational relations, 
so that it will eventually disrupt public policies 
and services in the community. This research 
sought to read the various significance arising 
in each of the institutions involved in HPG. 
To operationalize Barthes semiotic 
method, first we have read the regulation 
on halal product guarantees issued by the 
government, we interpret denotative and 
connotative meaning, then compared it with 
the meanings interpreted by the informants (i.e. 
for halal auditor). The meanings issued by the 
informants are also compared with all gestures 
that appear when giving statements of meaning. 
The meanings issued by the informants that 
are not mentioned in the regulation are then 
called the secondary meaning, or the meaning 
of significance.
Results 
Meanings of Law. 33 of 2014 and PP. 31 2019
Let us present a summary of the meanings 
that appear in the interpretation of the Halal 
Product Guarantee regulations issued by the 
government (No. 33 of 2014 and PP. 31 2019). 
This data is based on the results of interviews, 
gesture observations, and document studies of 
organizations related to the implementation of 
Halal Product Guarantee.
• Denotative Meaning
In denotative JPH regulation (Law No. 33 
of 201), as mentioned in article 3, is “providing 
comfort, security, safety, and certainty of the 
availability of Halal Products for the public in 
consuming and using products.” In addition, 
the administration of JPH also aims to “increase 
added value for businesses to produce and 
sell halal products“. On several interviews, the 
regulation is mandatory.
• Connotative Meaning
The statement above is straightforward 
about the denotative meaning of the Act. 33 
of 2014 and its derivatives. Furthermore, to 
carry out these objectives BPJPH was founded 
as an institution that organizes halal product 
guarantees.
Thus, BPJPH has power in JPH. Therefore, 
connotatively BPJPH is a representation of state 
power over the halal of a product. The meaning 
of this “state power” connotatively is also 
shown in article 4 which states that: “products 
that enter, circulate, and trade within the 
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territory of Indonesia must be halal-certified.” 
The mandate here suggests a state intervention 
on a food, drink, or other products consumed 
by Indonesian people. Any things that involve 
state intervention on a product are those that 
are “public”, regardless of any belief, but in this 
regulation, the state intervenes in a matter that 
is believed by a group of people on a product. 
In other words, in a democratic perspective, the 
state has intervened in the “private sphere”, 
namely the confidence of its citizens of an item.
But, based on an interview and gesture 
observation with an official at the Ministry of 
Religion in Province A (interview 23 October 
2019) and an LPH chairman from university 
B in Province A (interview 25 October 2019), 
it revealed such a competition, even a clash 
between these powers. “LPPOM seems 
unwilling, because inevitably it will lose 
income. For example, when I visited the UMKM 
Office, almost all of them there were auditors 
of LPPOM. If we are in charge (LPH other than 
LPPOM), “they will lose their revenue.” That 
was stated in one interview (interview with the 
head of LPH at B university B in Province A, 
25 October 2019). An official at the Province of 
Religion Ministry A also said that “There may 
be a sense of concern. When the government 
guarantees halal products later, they will 
no longer be involved” (interview with an 
echelon III official at the Provincial Office of the 
Ministry of Religion, October 23, 2019).
• JPH Regulation Meaning for Halal Auditors
As explained before, because it is 
mandatory to do, the more halal certifications 
are required, the more LPHs are needed. Each 
province will establish many LPHs, and this - as 
connotative meaning - will become “economic 
land” for LPH managers other than LPPOM-
MUI.
Besides LPH, there are auditors whose 
meaning needs to be seen. An auditor in 
the Act. No. 33 of 2014 is mentioned as 
a person who has the ability to carry out 
product halal inspection. The auditor is tasked 
with examining and reviewing the materials 
used, examining and reviewing the product 
processing, examining and reviewing the 
slaughtering system, examining the location of 
the product, examining equipment, production 
space, and storage, checking the distribution 
and presentation of the product, examining the 
halal guarantee system of business actors, and 
reporting examination results / and / or testing 
to LPH. Thus, the auditor is the “spearhead” 
of LPH. The auditor determines the halal of a 
product.
The auditors, especially those in LPPOM-
MUI that have been running halal product audit 
for a long time, will certainly have more work 
along with more income. This was revealed 
in an interview with one of the LPPOM-MUI 
auditors (interview with LPPOM-MUI auditor 
in Province A, 24 October 2019). This is not 
Table 1.
Summary of the meanings in the interpretation of the Halal Product Guarantee 








Halal Auditor Non 
LPPOM MUI
Ministry of Religion 
Regional Representative /
BPJPH 
Denotative Meaning Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory





- Increasing the 
auditor’s economic 
income
- New jobs - Conflict of economic 
interests between the 
status quo and newly 
institutionalized 
organizations
Source: Obtained from primary data
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despicable because it is in accordance with the 
“law” of professionalism, where a profession 
will determine the “price” that must be given. 
Therefore, actually there is no problem for the 
auditor with the new JPH regulation, and even 
now the auditors are free to choose which LPH 
they will work for, even though the LPPOM-
MUI auditors in Province A have signed an 
agreement to continue working as LPPOM-
MUI auditors.
Discussion
Divergent Interpretation, Power Relation, and 
Regulation Liminality
Based on theoretical frameworks, the 
results of this study show that the difference in 
meaning, especially in the connotative meaning, 
shows the difference in institutional logic used 
by organizational actors in responding to 
regulatory changes (Greenwood et al., 2010; 
P. H. Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2015). 
This is because the context and norms used 
in responding to these regulatory changes 
are different, there are only religious norms 
(guarantee of halal products as a religious 
obligation), political norms (guarantee of halal 
products as a guarantee of public power over 
their beliefs), and economic norms (guaranteed 
halal products increase economic income). 
Furthermore, we will show that the divergence 
in interpretation is also due to the political and 
personal power relations which have their 
respective institutional logics.
HPG regulation is a “language style” 
representing certain powers. According to this 
illustration of power and language (Wareing, 
2004), JPH regulation in the Act. No. 33 of 
2014 is the political power that regulates the 
halal product, but this political power does not 
lead to a closed power. With the “language of 
political power,” this regulation also opens 
space for “personal power” articulated in the 
“language” of LPHs and business people. Thus, 
in other words the regulation of the Act. No. 33 
of 2014 is a negotiation between political power 
and personal power, although the one that has 
the most power is political power.
Political (state) power over halal products 
at a glance has a negative connotation meaning, 
namely excessive state control over halal 
products consumed. However, the negative 
connotation about power is only a “myth” 
(not real meaning). In the concept of political 
ethics, the political power of the state about 
HPG is not a form of totalitarianism (the state 
mainly regulates everything, while the society 
follows all state commands). However, HPG 
regulations as a form of state political power in 
the context of the state’s duty are to: (1) provide 
protection to its citizens; (2) support or provide 
various community life services in the social, 
economic and religious fields (Magnis-Suseno, 
2019, p. 404).
The state’s duty in providing protection 
to its citizens in the context of HPG regulations 
is related to the protection of the state against 
the convenience of its citizens in consuming 
products, while, its duty to provide various 
community life services in the context of HPG 
is related to state services to guarantee its 
citizens in carrying out their religious teachings. 
However, in relation to the latter it does not 
mean the reunification of the state, but religion is 
an essential element in the welfare of religion, so 
the state is obliged to guarantee social conditions 
so that religions can exist and develop while 
respecting the freedom to practice the religions 
(Magnis-Suseno, 2019, pp. 404, 468).
Regulation as a sign of political power 
is used to show public confidence about the 
guaranteed implementation of the teachings 
of its citizens (positioning) (Hoed, 2011, p. 
176). Thus, BPJPH occupies a position as a 
representation of state power over the halal 
status of products, although this position leads 
to a positive direction. This requires BPJPH to 
play the role of attorney for the implementation 
of a good halal product guarantee.
Before the issuance and promulgation of 
the HPG Law, the executor of the halal product 
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guarantee was LPPOM MUI. LPPOM MUI 
was the one that “mastered” the certification 
of halal products together with the MUI 
Fatwa Commission in one institution. From 
registration to the issuance of halal certificates, 
LPPOM had many roles. BPOM also took 
a part to issue a halal label based on the 
recommendation of the MUI and LPPOM 
fatwa commission (see figures 1 and 2 above). 
Thus, practically LPPOM under MUI was 
the one mainly to play roles, and MUI is a 
social organization. Thus, it was a personal / 
community power.
From the two interviews and gesture 
observation, it can be interpreted that there is 
actually a competition and clash between state 
power (political power) and personal power. 
LPPOM as the executor of the pre-law halal 
product guarantee. No. 33 of 2014 feels it will 
“lose revenue,” because the certification process 
is no longer carried out by LPPOM. This was 
reinforced when asked about halal certification 
financing before the latest regulations. Some 
informants who were interviewed, always 
said that it was not clear, that the halal auditor 
at LPPOM in Province A did not really know 
how much the costs were incurred by business 
actors to process halal certification. The auditor 
only knows the cost of accommodation and 
transportation when auditing halal products 
(interview with LPPOM-MUI halal auditor 
Province A, 24 October 2019).
Conflicts between these “powers” become 
prevalent in the transition period of “power,” 
especially since the new power system cannot 
really be implemented. In the transition 
period, the situation of “liminality” becomes 
commonplace. This term is commonly used in 
social change by anthropologists. The concept of 
liminality, from the Latin word for ‘threshold’, 
implies all kinds of conditions “in between”. 
This concept is related to Victor Turner’s work, 
which is an extension of Arnold van Gennep’s 
original ideas (Rapport & Overing, 2000). There 
is an “abnormality” in a transitional “rite,” 
so there must be an adjustment that is even 
preceded by a “collision” and the conflict in it 
before finally entering the normal stage.
The abnormality is indicated by the 
unpreparedness of the new institution (BPJPH) 
in serving halal certification, while the demand 
is increasing. Moreover, there is a kind of 
disappointment, even rejection from the ruling 
system in the past. In the view of sociology 
(Soekanto, 1989, p. 320), change will result in 
disorganization due to the “abnormality” of 
the order, but the disorganization will form a 
reorganization or reintegration into the normal 
phase. The reorganization phase will succeed if 
it increases the effectiveness of the service so that 
it will reduce rejection. According to a semiotic 
perspective, the decline in rejection occurs when 
there is an “understanding” or similarity of 
“significance” (meaning) to regulation. As long 
as the significance that emerges from LPPOM is 
“revenue loss,” of course conflict will continue 
because there is a vested interest in it.
If significant disagreements about 
regulations continue to occur, organizations 
in the HPG system are not ready to serve 
the public who are clearly implementing the 
regulations. This will further increase public 
distrust of government performance, so that it 
will lead to a failure to comply with regulations 
(Widaningrum, 2017, p. 11). Therefore, the same 
significance is required to form an agreement 
to run a regulation normally.
Nevertheless ,  to  reach a  normal 
regulation, there are certainly compromises 
in order to emerge mutual similarity in 
significance or meaning. In the transition 
period, since the implementation of halal 
product assurance certification was switched 
to BPJPH as announced on October 17, many 
submissions for halal certification have been 
delayed due to BPJPH’s “unpreparedness” in 
practice in the field. Thus, business operators 
will wonder and be disappointed with the 
new regulations which in fact slow down 
halal guarantee services. Meanwhile, other 
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instruments in HPG, such as LPH and auditors 
are not really ready. There is only one LPH and 
its auditors ready with the established system, 
namely LPPOM-MUI.
Finally, a joint agreement between 
BPJPH, MUI, and LPPOM-MUI regarding halal 
certification services was decided on November 
20, 2019. The agreement stated that the for the 
applications of halal certification through BPJPH 
already  manually done and complete, cover 
letters were made to be forwarded to LPPOM-
MUI as LPH for halal examination or testing. The 
complete halal certification documents from the 
business actor were uploaded by BPJPH officers 
to LPPOM Online Certification (CEROL SS-2300). 
Although this was done during the transition 
period, it was considered a compromise. It means 
a change, where something long ago is not left 
completely quickly and immediately, because 
if it is done, the “clash” between interests will 
always happen, leading to the loss of the business 
community.
At first “agreement” - or called a “win-win 
solution” - shows the “victory” of LPPOM-MUI 
because it is still “in power” with the old system. 
However, if we see the connotative meaning, 
which is a substantive meaning of the HPG 
regulation, that the state power over halal product 
arises because of consideration to guarantee 
citizens to implement their religious teachings, 
including the teachings on halal products in 
Islam, the act of agreement wins business 
players and consumers. It has a negative side 
about politics and economics in the halal product 
guarantee system as some of the previous 
researchers concluded because this agreement 
is tantamount to giving the LPPOM-MUI full 
power as LPH in the transition period in order 
to maintain political-economic “stability” and 
inter-organizational relations.
Conclusion
T h i s  a r t i c l e  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  t h e 
interpretations of each organizational actor 
towards the new halal product policy in 
Indonesia are driven by different institutional 
logics, resulting in contradictions, even 
conflicts related to the relationship between 
organizations implementing the policy. 
The difference in meaning, especially in the 
connotative meaning, shows the difference 
in institutional logic used by organizational 
actors in responding to regulatory changes. 
This is because the context and norms used 
in responding to these regulatory changes 
are different. There are two norms that play 
the largest role in the interpretation of halal 
guarantee regulations, namely political and 
economic norms. Political norms are related 
to the power relations between the state and 
society, while economic norms are related to 
the economic benefits that are obtained from 
the enactment of regulations. This difference in 
institutional logic (institutional norms) causes 
conflict of relations between organizations. 
Therefore, all organizations and infrastructure 
need to be prepared properly and quickly. 
Besides, most importantly “significance” 
(meaning) needs to be equated in each 
organization dealing with HPG to realize 
the substantive-connotative meaning of HPG 
regulation.
However, this study suffers from several 
limitations. This article does not explore the 
latest development of several agreements 
between organizations. The research also 
does not cover all organizations in all 
regions of Indonesia, so it is not sufficient to 
comprehensively show the conflicts that arise 
due to different interpretations of the new 
regulations regarding HPG. In addition, this 
research has not sufficiently explored data 
from the perspective of firms that require halal 
certification services. Hence, these deficiencies 
can be continued in the further research agenda. 
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